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Abstract. This paper deals with the CAPM-derived capital budgeting criterion, and in particular 
with Rubinstein’s (1973) criterion, according to which a project is profitable if the project rate of 
return is greater than the risk-adjusted cost of capital, where the latter depends on the project’s 
disequilibrium systematic risk. It is shown that the disequilibrium net present value implied by 
this criterion, widely used in corporate finance, is nonadditive. Four proofs are provided: (i) a 
counterexample taken from Copeland and Weston (1988), (ii) a modus-tollens argument showing 
that this notion of NPV is incompatible with additivity, (iii) a formalization showing that this 
NPV does not fulfil the principle of description invariance (iv) an example showing that CAPM-
minded evaluators may incur arbitrage losses. 
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Introduction 
 This paper deals with project valuation and capital-budgeting decision-making. In applied 
corporate finance, it is usual to use the net-present-value concept in order to appraise investments 
and make decisions. The net present value (NPV) requires cash flow discounting by making use 
of the so-called risk-adjusted cost of capital, which serves the purpose of accounting for risk. A 
widespread model employed for computing the cost of capital is the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). Rubinstein (1973) and other scholars in the late Sixties and Seventies have provided 
the link between CAPM and capital budgeting decision: in their classical contributions they 
show that, if the CAPM assumptions are met, then the cost of capital is a function of the 
systematic risk, which is given by the beta of the project. The latter depends in turn on the cost of 
the project, which implies that it is a disequilibrium beta. The corresponding NPV is therefore a 
disequilibrium NPV.  
 In the corporate finance literature, there is no debate about this procedure, which is 
widespread for both valuation and decision purposes. For example,  Bøssaerts and Odegaard 
(2001) endorse the use of cost-based betas and disequilibrium NPVs “to value a risky cash flow” 
(p. 60); Copeland and Weston mostly take for granted that an investor should use the 
disequilibrium NPV for decision and valuation; in Weston and Copeland (1988) they give the 
formula of the disequilibrium NPV referring to it as ‘‘the risk-adjusted method for evaluating 
projects’’ (p. 381). These authors provide several numerical  examples to illustrate the 
implementation of the this NPV (e.g., Copeland and Weston, 1983, p. 135; Weston and 
Copeland, 1988, pp. 372–375 and 379–381; Copeland and Weston, 1988, pp. 415–418). Jones 
and Dudley (1978, p. 378) compute the required rate of return of a mispriced asset by 
discounting cash flows with a cost-based discount rate, that is by using the disequilibrium NPV 
(see their Tables 18.2 and 18.3). Lewellen (1977) uses the disequilibrium NPV approach for 
valuation. While stating his rule in a return-rate-exceeds-cost-of-capital fashion, Rubinstein 
(1973) himself refers to the disequilibrium NPV upholding it not only for decision purposes but 
for valuation purposes as well: in the last sentence of the second paragraph at p. 174 of his paper 
the author writes that the (risk-adjusted) cost of capital is the “appropriate discount rate for the 
project”. Some pages earlier he makes the same claim, when he writes of “risk-adjusted discount 
rate for the project” and repeats the expression “discount rate” just after the sentence (p. 172). If 
Rubinstein thinks the (disequilibrium) cost of capital is the appropriate discount rate for the 
project, then he thinks that the disequilibrium NPV is actually the correct NPV. Also, in footnote 
14 at p. 174, he writes, referring to mutually exclusive investments: “This result follows 
immediately from equation (c) of footnote and is equivalent to accepting the project with the 
highest net present value”. He is then claiming that the disequilibrium NPV is a correct tool not 
only for accept-reject decisions, but for ranking projects as well. Also, in footnote 8 he uses the 
expression “present value risk-adjusted discount rate . . . form”. That is, he refers to the 
(disequilibrium) NPV and uses the term “value” to mean the result of the (cost-based) 
discounting process.  
 This paper aims at showing that the disequilibrium NPV, well-entrenched in the literature 
and in the practice and validly deducted from the CAPM as a decision rule for accept-reject 
decisions, it is nonetheless unsafe both as a valuation tool and as a decision rule: it does not 
comply with the additivity principle or, to say it in different terms, it does not comply with the 
principle of description invariance nor with the no-arbitrage principle. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly formalizes Rubinstein’s criterion and 
shows that it implies the use of disequilibrium NPV for decision-making. Section 2 shows that 
this NPV is nonadditive, which implies that it may not be used for valuation nor for decision 
purposes. In this section (i) a numerical example is illustrated, taken from Copeland and Weston 
(1988); (ii) a logical argument (modus tollens) is provided to highlight inconsistencies; (iii) it is 
shown  that framing effects arise if this NPV is used; (iv) it is underlined the evaluator abiding 
by the disequilibrium NPV method is open to arbitrage losses. Some remarks conclude the paper. 
 
1.  Disequilibrium (cost-based) beta and disequilibrium NPV 
 Assume that there exists a security market where a security market satisfying the 
assumptions of the CAPM. In such a case, any asset traded in the security market lies on the 
Security Market Line (SML) and its rate of return is given by the relation 
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Eqs. (1a)-(1b) may be restated in net-present-value terms: 
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Solving (1c) for jV  we have the well-known certainty-equivalent form 
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Let us now suppose a project j is available to a firm and decision must be taken about 
undertaking it or not. In a classical pellucid paper, Rubinstein (1973, pp. 171-172 and footnote 
10) proves that, if the above relation holds, and if the objective is shareholder maximization,  
then the project is worth undertaking if  
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where the right-hand side is often called risk-adjusted cost of capital. Criterion (2a) is 
mathematically equivalent to 
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It is worth noting that the covariance term in (2a)-(2b) depends on project cost jI , not on the 
equilibrium value of the project. The resulting covariance is a disequilibrium (cost-based) 
covariance, so to say, not an equilibrium covariance.  
 
 Senbet and Thompson (1978) show that the capital budgeting criteria proposed by Hamada 
(1969), Bierman and Hass (1973), Rubinstein (1973), Stapleton (1971), Bogue and Roll (1974) 
are equivalent. The same criterion is also found in Litzenberger and Budd (1970), where they 
explicitly acknowledge the equivalence of Mossin’s criterion, Hamada’s criterion, and Tuttle and 
Litzenberger’s (1968) criterion. (In the Appendix of this paper the equivalence of Rubinstein’s 
criterion and Mossin’s criterion is shown).  
 
As it is clear from eq. (2b), for practical implementation this criterion requires to fulfil the 
following steps: 
 
 
o Forecast end-of-period payoff from the project in the possible states of nature 
o Forecast market rate of return in the possible states of nature 
o Compute covariance between project’s payoff and market rate of return 
o Divide by the project’s cost 
o Determine the market price of risk λ  
 
Hence, according to the disequilibrium NPV supporters, the sign of eq. (2b) tells decision amker 
whether the project is profitable, and the discounted end-of-period payoff gives the project’s 
value (see Copeland and Weston, 1983, 1988 and Weston and Copeland for several numerical 
examples). 
 
2. Nonadditivity 
 Additivity in valuation is a major tenet in finance. The net present value is acceptable as a 
meaningful notion only if it is additive. Formally, additivity means that 
kjkj +=+ NPVNPVNPV for all  j, k.    (3) 
In words, picking any pair of projects j and k, the sum of their NPVs must equal the NPV of that 
project (j+k) obtained by summing the cash flows of the two projects. We now show that 
condition eq. (3) is not fulfilled if the disequilibrium NPV in eq. (2b) is used for valuation.  
 
2.1 Counterexample 
 Let us consider a very simple numerical example taken from the classical textbook by 
Copeland and Weston (1988). At pages 414-418 the authors present two projects and calculate 
their risk-adjusted cost of capital.  They employ 
j
mj
mj I
r
rr
),cov(F
),cov( =  to compute the risk-
adjusted cost of capital (see their eq. (12.30)). Tables 1 and 2 collect all the relevant data and 
calculations made by the authors (rates are given in percentage). As the reader may see, the costs 
of capital are −9.33% for project 1 and 14% for project 2. Using these costs of capital it is very 
simple for an investor to calculate the NPVs of the projects. We find 
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Let us now consider the project obtained by summing the cash flows of project 1 and project 2 
and let us calculate the cost of capital and the NPV by using again the very same formulas (see 
Tables 3 and 4). We find a cost of capital of 2.33%. The NPV of project (1+2) is therefore 
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This means that  
2121 NPV583.3452.6356.9808.15NPVNPV +=≠=−=+ . 
In other terms, condition (3) does not hold.  
 It is worth noting that if we suppose that project 1’s cost is 104.6 (other things equal), then 
we find 
 
091.1NPV356.9NPV464.10NPV 2121 −=−== +   (7) 
so that 
2121 NPV091.1108.1NPVNPV +=−≠=+ . 
Additivity is not satisfied and, in addition, we have two NPVs of opposite sign, leading to 
different decisions about undertaking the same course of action: if the course of action is seen as 
the sum of two separate projects (to be both undertaken or both rejected), then the course of 
action is rejected; if cash flows are seen as aggregate amounts so that the gross alternative (1+2) 
is evaluated as a unique alternative, then the course of action is undertaken. 
  
2.2 Modus tollens 
 Let us consider project j whose initial outflow is jI  and the final payoff is the random sum 
jF . Let us assume that  
(i) additivity holds 
(ii) the disequilibrium NPV is used for valuation. 
It is easy to show that these assumptions imply that the project’s NPV can be any real number. In 
fact, let α  be the desired NPV and choose a pair 2*)*,( Rkh ∈  such that  
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where we let fR := fr+1 . Manipulating algebraically we get to 
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By assumption (ii), a net present value is calculated as in eq. (2b), and α  may be interpreted as 
the sum of two projects’ NPVs: the first project costs  *hI j −  and pays off the random sum 
*F kj − , the second project costs *h  and pays off the certain amount *k . Let us call 1j  the 
first risky project and 2j  the second riskless project. Given that **)(FF kkjj +−=  and 
**)( hhII jj +−=  we evidently have 21 jjj +=  (the two project are constituents of 
project j ). By assumption (i) we have 
jjj NPVNPVNPV 21 =+=α . 
As α  is any real number, then the NPV of project j  is whatever number one wants it to be. To 
avoid this nonsense, one is bound to conclude, by modus tollens, that the two assumptions (i) and 
(ii) cannot simultaneously hold. In other terms, the disequilibrium NPV as expressed in eq. (2) 
and deducted by Rubinstein (1973) on the basis of the CAPM is incompatible with the notion of 
additivity. 
  
2.3 Description invariance 
 Let us consider again project j  above and let  
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with 2R),( ∈kh . Additivity implies that ),( khf  is constant under changes in h and k: 
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To see that condition (8) does not hold, we just need to calculate the first partial derivatives of 
the function. After simple algebraic manipulations we find 
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which are not identically zero. This means that the function ),( khf  is not invariant with respect 
to h and k or, equivalently, additivity is not fulfilled. Therefore, valuation changes depending on 
the way a course of action is depicted (see Magni, 2002, section 4) and evaluators do not abide 
by the principle of description invariance, whose violations are known as “framing effects” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Soman, 2004).  
  
2.4 Arbitrage loss 
 As seen, an NPV-minded decision-maker (DM) adopting eq. (2) may frame courses of 
action in different but logically equivalent ways obtaining different valuations. This implies that 
he is open to possible arbitrage losses, as in the following case. Suppose an arbitrageur offers an 
NPV-minded DM an agreement according to which they exchange the same cash flows 
generated by project 1, with the arbitrageur taking a short position (he will be the borrower) and 
the DM a long position (he will be the lender); but the arbitrageur warns the DM that if he 
accepts this agreement he will have to pay a 15-euros fee. The NPV of project 1 is 15.808 euros 
(see eq. (4)), which represents the maximum fee the DM is willing to pay in order to accept the 
agreement. Being 15<15.808 he accepts. Now suppose the arbitrageur offers the DM the 
opportunity of exchanging project (1+2)’s cash flows where the arbitrageur will be now the 
lender and the DM will be the borrower; but if the DM accepts he will receive a 4-euros prize. 
The NPV for the DM is  –3.583 euros (consider eq. (6) changed in sing), but 4>3.583 so he 
accepts again. Finally, the arbitrageur offers the DM the opportunity of exchanging the same 
cash flows generated by project 2 with the arbitrageur being the borrower and the DM acting as 
the lender; if he accepts, he will be rewarded by the arbitrageur with a 10-euros prize. Project 2’s 
NPV  is  –9.356 (see eq. (5)), but as 10>9.356 he accepts again. As a result, the NPV-minded 
DM is trapped in an arbitrage loss of 1 euro (net cash flows for the DM are summarized in Table 
5. The arbitrageur’s cash flows are the same reversed in sign).1 
 
Conclusions 
 This paper deals with the well-established CAPM-derived capital budgeting criterion and 
the notion of disequilibrium cost of capital, which Rubinstein (1973) fosters in his classical paper 
and which mathematically implies the use of the disequilibrium NPV for capital budgeting. The 
use of disequilibrium NPVs is widespread in applied corporate finance, both in the literature and 
in the practice, both as a valuation tool and a decision rule. There is no debate in the literature 
about possible flaws of this capital budgeting rule. This paper aims at highlighting that the 
disequilibrium NPV is nonadditive and may not  be used for valuation, given that it is 
nonadditive. As for decision-making while it is  indeed logically deducted by from the CAPM 
(eq. (2b) is mathematically equivalent to eq. (2a), and eq. (2a) is deductively implied by the 
CAPM), its very use for decision-making is unsafe, because it leaves decision makers open to 
arbitrage losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 If one changes the framing and aggregates the fee/prize and the initial cash flow for each alternative, and calculates 
NPVs, then the arbitrage loss does not occur. This is actually a violation of description invariance (existence of 
arbitrage losses should not depend on the way the evaluator frames the problem). 
Appendix 
Mossin (1969, p. 755, left column) shows that, assuming the market is in equilibrium, an 
investment Z will be undertaken by a firm l if and only if 
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where  ZF  is the cash flow generated by the project, mV  is the end-of-period value of the 
security market, ZI  is the investment cost, and 
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with lF =free cash flow of firm l,  lV =market value of firm l. Dividing both sides of (A.1) by 
ZI we have 
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Letting 0V  be the current value of the market, we have ),cov(),(cov 0 mZmZ rrVVr = . 
Therefore, we have, using (A.2) , 
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where lr  is the rate of return on firm l.
2 The term
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 “is the same for all companies” 
(Mossin, 1969, p. 755, right column), so that 
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As a result, eq. (A.7) becomes  
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which coincide with eqs. (2a) and (2b) respectively, with j=Z. 
Q.E.D. 
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Notational conventions used in the paper 
jF = End-of-period cash flow of asset/project  j  jI = Cost of project j  
jF = Expected end-of-period cash flow of asset/project j jr = Rate of return of asset or project j 
jr = Expected rate of return of asset/project j  fr = Risk-free rate of return  
mr = Market rate of return     mr = Expected market rate of return 
2
mσ = Variance of market rate of return    jV = Value of asset/project j 
jNPV = NPV of asset/project j    ),(cov ⋅⋅ = Covariance operator  
 Table 1. Copeland and Weston’s example –cash flows and rates of return 
  
Market 
 Project 1 
( 1001 =I ) 
 Project 2 
( 1002 =I ) 
 Probability mr  fr   1F  1r   2F  2r  
          
State 1 0.333 26 4  105 5  107.5 7.5 
State 2 0.333 14 4  115 15  100 0 
State 3 0.333 20 4  95 –5  102.5 2.5 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Copeland and Weston’s example –relevant statistics and 
values 
     
 jr  ),(cov mj rr  jβ  ji  
     
Project 1 5.00 −0.002 −0.833 −9.33 
Project 2 3.33 0.0015 0.625 14.00 
Market 20.00 0.0024 1.000  
 
 
Table 3. Project (1+2) –cash flow and rates of return 
    
   Project (1+2) ( 20021 =+I ) 
 Probability  21F +  21+r  
     
State 1 0.333  212.5 6.25 
State 2 0.333  215 7.50 
State 3 0.333  197.5 1.25 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4. Project (1+2) –relevant statistics and 
values 
     
 21+r  ),(cov 21 mrr + 21+β  21+i  
     
Project C 4.166 −0.00025 −0.104 2.33 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5. Arbitrage loss 
 Time 0 Time 1 
First contract (cash flows) –100 F1 
First contract (fee) –15 0 
Second contract (cash flows) 200 –(F1+F2) 
Second contract (prize) 4 0 
Third contract (cash flows) –100 F2 
Third contract (prize) 10 0 
Net Cash Flows –1 0 
